Every check, and what it means
The full catalogue of checks with the reasoning behind each one.
Email authentication
- MX present — whether the domain receives mail. Informational; it changes how we read the other email findings.
- SPF present — a record listing who may send as this domain.
- SPF duplicates — two
v=spf1records is a permanent error and disables SPF entirely. - SPF lookup count — we follow every
include:andredirect=and count the DNS lookups. Over ten and receivers return permerror, so SPF stops protecting the domain while still looking correct in the DNS panel. - SPF all mechanism —
+allauthorises the entire internet and is worse than no record. - DMARC present / policy / reporting / subdomain — whether a policy exists, whether it is actually enforcing, whether reports are collected, and whether subdomains are exempted.
- DKIM — we probe twenty selectors used by the major mail platforms. A custom selector cannot be discovered from outside, so a negative result here is reported as "not found", not "absent".
- MTA-STS and TLS-RPT — protection against an attacker stripping encryption from inbound mail.
Certificates and encryption
- HTTPS available, expiry (escalating inside 30 / 14 / 7 days), chain trust, hostname coverage, and obsolete protocol support (TLS 1.0 / 1.1).
DNS and domain
- DNSSEC, nameserver redundancy, CAA records, and **dangling records that allow subdomain takeover**.
Subdomain takeover deserves a note: we check a fixed list of common hostnames for CNAMEs pointing
at third-party services, and we only report a takeover when the service itself responds saying
the resource no longer exists. An unreachable host is ambiguous and we do not report it. A false
takeover claim in a client-facing report is far more damaging than a missed one.
Website hardening
- HTTP to HTTPS redirect, HSTS (including a max-age that is long enough to matter), Content Security Policy, clickjacking protection, MIME sniffing protection, Referrer-Policy, and cookie Secure / HttpOnly flags.
Exposed surface
- Server version disclosure and CMS identification run on any scan, from the homepage.
- Exposed configuration files —
.env,.git/config, database dumps, phpinfo, debug logs,server-status, and directory listings — run only on verified domains.
Every one of those probes confirms content before reporting: we do not report an exposed .env
because a request returned 200, only when the response actually looks like an environment file.
This keeps soft-404 pages out of client reports.
Still stuck?
Send us a message — include the domain and we will look at it.